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On the Robustness of Brain Gain Estimates
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Recent theoretical studies suggest that migration prospects can raise the expected return to 
human capital and thus foster education investment at home or, in other words, induce a 
brain gain. In a recent paper (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, Economic Journal, 2008) we 
used the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set on emigration rates by education level to 
examine the impact of brain drain migration on gross (pre-migration) human capital formation 
in developing countries. We found a positive effect of skilled migration prospects on human 
capital growth in a cross-section of 127 developing countries, with an elasticity of about 5 
percent. In this paper we assess the robustness of our results to the use of alternative brain 
drain measures, definitions of human capital, and functional forms. We find that the results 
hold using the Beine et al. (2007) alternative brain drain measures controlling for whether 
migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the host country. We also regress other 
indicators of human capital investment on skilled migration rates and find a positive effect on 
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7641476). 1 Introduction
Starting with Mountford (1997), a recent theoretical literature has suggested that
migration prospects can raise the expected return to human capital and thus foster
education investment at home or, in other words, induce a brain gain.1 To the best
of our knowledge, the ￿rst paper to investigate this question empirically was our joint
paper published in the Journal of Development Economics in 2001. This was a ￿rst
but imperfect try since we had to use gross migration rates as a proxy measure for
the brain drain due to the lack of comparative data on international migration by
education levels. In a more recent paper (Beine et al., 2008), we used the Docquier
and Marfouk (2006) data set on emigration rates by education level to examine the
impact of brain drain migration on gross (pre-migration) human capital formation
in developing countries. We found a positive e⁄ect of skilled migration prospects on
human capital growth in a cross-section of 127 developing countries, with an elasticity
of about 5 percent. In this paper we assess the robustness of our results to the use of
alternative brain drain measures, de￿nitions of human capital, and functional forms.
We ￿nd that the results hold using the Beine et al. (2007) alternative brain drain
measures controlling for whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the
host country. We also regress other indicators of human capital investment on skilled
migration rates and ￿nd a positive e⁄ect on youth literacy while the e⁄ect on school
enrolment depends on the exact speci￿cation chosen.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework
and derives the main testable implications of the analysis. Section 3 summarizes the
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set, which we supplement with the brain drain
estimates computed by Beine et al. (2007), who controlled for immigrants￿age of
entry as a proxy for whether schooling was acquired in the home or in the host
country. The empirical analysis is conducted in Section 4. We ￿rst discuss a number
of econometric issues and then present the results for the benchmark model (our EJ
results) as well as for alternative speci￿cations, human capital measures, and brain
drain indicators. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical and empirical framework
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical model describing the incentive mech-
anism related to skilled migration prospects. Then we describe how this model can
be empirically tested.2
1See also Vidal (1998), Stark et al. (1998), Docquier and Rapoport (1999), Beine et al. (2001).
Using a slightly di⁄erent perspective, Stark et al. (1997) also elaborated on the possibility of a brain
gain associated with a brain drain in a context of imperfect information with return migration. See
Docquier and Rapoport (2008) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
2This section is reproduced from our EJ paper.
22.1 Theoretical background
Consider a stylized small open developing economy where output is proportional to
labor measured in e¢ ciency units3, Yt = wtLt. Due to exogenous inter-country pro-
ductivity di⁄erentials, the equilibrium wage rate in this economy, wt; is lower than
in the developed nations. At birth, individuals are endowed with a given level of
human capital normalized to one. They live for two periods, and make two decisions:
whether to invest in education during their youth, and whether to migrate in adult-
hood. There is a unique education program e. For an individual opting for education;
the number of e¢ ciency units once adult is given by h > 1 while the cost of education,
which is decreasing in personal ability, is denoted by c, a variable with cumulative
distribution F(c) and density function f(c) de￿ned on R+.
Once adult, people can emigrate to a high-wage destination with probability p for
skilled workers and p for unskilled workers. As explained in our introduction, selective
immigration policies, together with the tendency for migrants to positively self-select
out of the general population, explain why emigration rates are much higher among
the highly educated and skilled. For example, Docquier and Marfouk￿ s (2006) data,
detailed in Section 3 below, reveal that emigration propensities are ￿ve to ten times
higher for workers with more than twelve years of education than for workers with less
than twelve years of education. We will therefore assume that p >p. For analytical
simplicity, we normalize p to zero. Also, in what follows we treat p as exogenous, as if
it was the result of a relative quota set by immigration authorities in the destination
country independently of the number of potential visa applicants. However, we could
equally assume that a given number of visas is attributed, which can be translated
into a probability of receiving an entry visa by agents with rational (in which case the
adjustment is immediate)4 or adaptative (in which case the subjective and objective
probabilities only coincide at the steady state) expectations with respect to others￿
education decisions.5
Individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral and maximize lifetime income. There is
no intertemporal discounting of income. As explained, unskilled workers are assumed
to remain in the home country and therefore earn the domestic wage w in both peri-
ods. In contrast, skilled workers have the possibility to migrate to a technologically
more advanced country where the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of human capital is
w￿ > w: They earn w ￿ c in the ￿rst period and then either w￿h if they migrate or
wh if they don￿ t. For a given migration probability p, the condition for investing in
3Assuming a constant-returns-to-scale production function with physical capital and labor would
give the same outcome provided that physical capital is perfectly mobile across countries. The
international interest rate would determine the levels of capital per worker and wages. Output
would then be proportional to L.
4Formally, p can be a decreasing function of cp(p) in (1), de￿ning an implicit solution for p.
5In the empirical analysis, however, it will be important to assess the exogeneity of the migration
probability.
3education is therefore:
wt ￿ c + (1 ￿ p)wt+1h + pw
￿
t+1h > wt + wt+1
and individuals will opt for education if
c < cp;t ￿ wt+1(h ￿ 1) + ph(w
￿
t+1 ￿ wt+1) (1)
Clearly, migration prospects raise the expected return to human capital in the
developing country, thus inducing more people to invest in education. The critical
threshold cp;t is increasing in the probability of migration and in the wage di⁄erential
with the destination country. This suggests that the incentive e⁄ect of migration will
be stronger in poor countries. However, credit constraints on education investments
are likely to be more binding in poor countries. To take this into account, we introduce
a minimum threshold of ￿rst-period consumption, ￿t, which must be ￿nanced out of
￿rst-period earnings. Hence, for any educated individual, it must be the case that
wt ￿ c > ￿t or, equivalently, that:
c < cl;t ￿ wt ￿ ￿t (2)
Liquidity constraints are binding if cl;t < cp;t, that is, if wt￿wt+1(h￿1)￿ph(w￿
t ￿
wt) < ￿t: At the steady state (i.e., for wt = wt+1); the binding liquidity constraints
condition may be written as:
w(2 ￿ h) ￿ ph(w
￿ ￿ w) < ￿:
We therefore impose the restriction that h 2 [1;2] to allow for the possibility of
either binding or non-binding constraints, depending on the value of w: It is clear
from the last expression that liquidity constraints are more likely to be binding in
poor countries (low w) facing high emigration rates (high p).
We denote by Ha;t and Hp;t respectively the gross or ex-ante (i.e., before migration
occurs) and the net or ex-post (i.e., once emigration is netted out) proportions of
educated in the population, which we take as a measure of the country￿ s human capital
level. The proportion of young agents opting for education is given by Ha;t = F(c￿
t)
where c￿
t = Min(cp;t;cl;t) while the proportion of skilled adults remaining in the










@p ￿ Ha(1 ￿ Ha)
(1 ￿ pHa)
2
Using the above expression, it appears that:
4￿ There is a possibility of bene￿cial brain drain over some ranges of p providing
that
@Hp
@p is positive at p = 0. This ￿rst requires that @Ha
@p is positive (i.e., there
is an incentive e⁄ect), which implies that liquidity constraints are not binding
in the closed economy;
￿ At the margin, an increase in the rate of skilled emigration is good for human
capital formation if
@Hp
@p is positive at the current emigration rate. Again, this
￿rst requires that liquidity constraint are not binding, but this time at the
current level of p;
￿ Finally, the total or net e⁄ect of migration on human capital formation can
be obtained by comparing the ex-post (or net) level of human capital with
its counterfactual level in the closed economy solution, Hpjp=0 = Hajp=0 ￿ e H.
There is a bene￿cial brain drain if the net e⁄ect is positive, that is, if Hp > e H.
As explained, the realization of these conditions depends on whether liquidity
constraints are binding as well as on the ability distribution. For illustrative purposes,
let us consider the case of a uniform distribution: c   U [0;1] and assume ￿ < w ￿ 1
to avoid corner solutions. With a uniform distribution, Ha = c￿ = Min(cp;cl).
Starting from a closed economy equilibrium, three con￿gurations arise.
The most pessimistic one occurs when liquidity constraints are binding in the
closed economy. In this case, when w(2 ￿ h) < ￿ (i.e., when the domestic wage rate
is low), there can be no incentive e⁄ect: @Ha
@p = 0. Hence, any marginal increase in




￿(w ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ w + ￿)]
(1 ￿ p[w ￿ ￿])
2 < 0
Obviously, in this case the brain drain can only be detrimental (Hp < e H).
An intermediate con￿guration arises when liquidity constraints are not binding
in the closed economy but become binding once migration prospects are introduced.
In this case, when w(2 ￿ h) > ￿ > w(2 ￿ h) ￿ ph(w￿ ￿ w) (i.e., when the domestic
wage rate is not too low and the migration rate is relatively high), a su¢ ciently small
degree of openess can foster ex-post (or net) human capital if
@Hp
@p is positive at p = 0,
that is if
h(w
￿ ￿ w) > w(h ￿ 1)[1 ￿ w(h ￿ 1)] (4)
However, at the current migration rate, a marginal increase in p reduces the pro-
portion of educated remaining in the economy as binding credit constraints do not
allow for the incentive e⁄ect to operate further (@Ha
@p = 0). The net e⁄ect is positive
(Hp > e H) if the skilled emigration probability does not exceed the following critical
value:
p <
w(2 ￿ h) ￿ ￿
(w ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ h)
5The most optimistic case arises when liquidity constraints are never binding, thus
allowing for the incentive e⁄ect to fully operate. In this case, obtained when w(2 ￿
h)￿ph(w￿￿w) > ￿ (i.e., when the domestic wage rate is high enough and the skilled
emigration rate is su¢ ciently low), the condition for a su¢ ciently small degree of
openess to foster net human capital formation is the same as in (4) and the net e⁄ect
is positive (Hp > e H) when the skilled emigration rate does not exceed the following
critical value:
p <
h(w￿ ￿ w) ￿ w(h ￿ 1)[1 ￿ w(h ￿ 1)]
h(w￿ ￿ w)[1 ￿ w(h ￿ 1)]
Finally, the sign of
@Hp
@p evaluated at the current migration rate can be positive or
negative depending on the wage di⁄erential and on the magnitude of emigration.
When p tends to one, clearly,
@Hp
@p is more likely to become negative.
On the whole, our simple theoretical model predicts that migration prospects can
stimulate the accumulation of human capital in developing countries under certain
conditions: ￿rst, there must be an incentive e⁄ect (or brain gain), and second, the
latter must be greater than actual skilled emigration (or brain drain). The incentive
e⁄ect would seem to be potentially stronger in poor countries but may be limited
there if liquidity constraints are binding. It is therefore a priori unclear whether
poor or intermediate income countries experience the strongest incentive e⁄ects and,
consequently, it is also unclear which type of countries gain or lose more from the
brain drain. In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the incentive e⁄ect.
2.2 Related empirical model
To evaluate the incentive hypothesis described theoretically in (1), we use a ￿-
convergence empirical model and regress the growth rate of the ex-ante stock of
human capital (i.e., including emigrants) between 1990 and 2000, ￿ln(Ha); on a set
of explanatory variables:
￿ln(Ha;90￿00) ￿ ln(Ha;00) ￿ ln(Ha;90) (5)
￿ln(Ha;90￿00) = a0 + a1:ln(Ha;90) + a2:ln(p90) + a3:DENS90
+a4:SSAD + a5:LATD + a6:RM90 + ￿ (6)
It is this human capital formation equation, Equation (6), that we estimate econo-
metrically in Section 4.2. Together with the tautological equation de￿ning the change
in the ex-ante stock (Equation 5), it forms our benchmark empirical model. In Sec-
tion 4.3, we will use non-linear variants by allowing the emigration rate, ln(p90); to
interact with dummy variables for whether the country￿ s income per capita was lower
than a given threshold in 1990. Such non-linear e⁄ects are introduced to capture the
role of liquidity constraints6.
The following explanatory variables enter in the estimation of Equation (6):
6Tests were also conducted with dummies based on poverty rates.
6￿ The log of the initial level of ex-ante human capital, ln(Ha;90); to capture po-
tential catching-up e⁄ects. A negative sign for the coe¢ cient a1 would indicate
convergence in natives￿(residents plus emigrants) human capital among the
countries sampled.
￿ The log of the skilled migration rate at the beginning of the period, ln(p90); as
a proxy for the migration incentives faced by educated individuals. Ideally, the
incentive e⁄ect of migration on human capital investment should be identi￿ed
through the impact of migration prospects on expected returns to education.
However, these cannot be computed directly as there are no comparative data
on education premia in developing countries. Using di⁄erences in GNI per
capita, on the other hand, raises endogeneity concerns as this variable is strongly
correlated with human capital. In our benchmark model, we will thus let aside
wage di⁄erentials and di⁄erences in GNI per capita and use instead ln(p90): A
positive sign for the coe¢ cient a2 indicates that the incentive e⁄ect operates
(i.e., there is a brain gain).
￿ The population density in 1990, DENS90; as a proxy for the cost of acquiring
education. Clearly, education costs depend on a host of factors such as public
expenditures on general and higher education, distances to schools, etc. How-
ever, public expenditures on education at the beginning of the sample period
(in 1990) are statistically very highly correlated in our sample with the initial
level of human capital H90: This certainly suggests that such expenditures are
e⁄ective, but the magnitude of the correlation (0.72) precludes any correct joint
estimation of the impact of public expenditures and of possible convergence ef-
fects. Population density is likely to reduce distances to schools and, therefore,
to decrease the opportunity cost of education.
￿ Workers￿remittances as a share of GDP, RM90, ￿rst because they can relax
credit constraints on human capital investment, and second, because in the
absence of statistics on return migration, they provide an indirect means of
controlling for possible returns in subsequent periods.7
￿ Regional dummies for sub-Saharan Africa (SSAD) and Latin America (LATD).
7Indeed, preparing one￿ s return is known to be a central motivation to remit and remittances
tend to decline over time as migrants become better integrated in the host country, families are
reunited and return prospects diminish. See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a comprehensive
survey of migrants remittances.
73 Data
3.1 Emigration rates by educational attainment (Docquier
and Marfouk, 2006)
Our benchmark empirical analysis is based on the (World Bank sponsored) Docquier
and Marfouk (2006) (henceforth DM) dataset. DM collected data on immigration by
education level and country of birth from nearly all OECD countries in 1990 and 2000,
using the same methodology and de￿nitions as Carrington and Detragiache (1998)
but extending their work in a number of ways. First, census, register and survey
data reporting immigrants￿educational levels and countries of birth were used for 27
OECD countries in 2000 (which account for 98 percent of the OECD immigration
stock) and 24 countries in 1990 (91 percent). For the few remaining countries for
which census data were not available, existing data by country of birth were splitted
across educational levels on the basis of the regional structure or of the OECD average.
On this basis, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) obtained reliable emigration rates by
education level for 195 emigration countries in 2000 and 174 countries in 1990. As
for the Carrington and Detragiache￿ s dataset, South-South migration is not taken
into account; however, on the basis of census data collected from selected non-OECD
countries, DM estimate that about 90 percent of all highly￿ skilled migrants live in
the OECD area.
The method used by DM is to rely on receiving country r0s census or population
register to extract information on immigrants country of birth, age, and skill level.
Let Mr
t;s denote the stock of working-age individuals born in a given country, of skill
level s, s = l; m; h (for low, medium and high) and living in country r at time t. The




is then obtained by summing over receiving countries. Emigration rates by education
levels are then obtained by comparing the number of emigrants to the population
at origin with similar characteristics, Nt;s. For each education category, emigration





and its share among the total native population (residents and emigrants included)
by
Ha;t =
Nt;h + Mt;h P
s (Nt;s + Mt;s)
:
These steps require collecting data on the size and skill structure of the working-
age population in the origin countries. Population data by age are provided by
the United Nations.8 Data are missing for a small number of countries but can be
estimated using the CIA world factbook.9 Population data are split across educational
8See http://esa.un.org/unpp.
9See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
8groups using international human capital indicators. The DM data set is based on
the Barro and Lee (1993, 2001) estimates for most countries. For countries where
the Barro and Lee measures are missing, DM transposed the skill structure of the
neighboring country with the closest average school enrolment rate.
We measure the emigration rate of skilled workers as the emigration rate among
individuals with tertiary education: pt = pt;h. As emigration rates are strongly in-
creasing in human capital, we will also assume that the minimal or incompressible
emigration rate is the one observed among people with primary education: pt = pt;l.
3.2 Brain drain estimates corrected for age of entry (Beine
et al, 2007)
The DM estimates are built according to a broad de￿nition of ￿ skilled immigrants￿
in that they include all foreign-born workers with tertiary schooling; for example,
Mexican-born individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or 10 and then graduated
from US high-education institutions later on are counted as highly-skilled Mexican
immigrants. In contrast, Rosenzweig (2005) suggests that only people with home-
country higher education should be considered as skilled immigrants. This must be
considered as a lower-bound measure of the brain drain. Indeed, except for those
arrived at very young age, most of the immigrants who then acquired host country
tertiary education arrived with some level of home country pre-tertiary schooling. In
addition, some of them would still have engaged in higher education in the home
country in the absence of emigration prospects.10
In Beine et al. (2007) we use immigrants￿age of entry as a proxy for where
education has been acquired and provide alternative measures of the brain drain by
de￿ning skilled immigrants as those arrived in the receiving country after age 12, 18
or 22. We use data on age of entry collected in a sample of OECD countries and then
econometrically estimate the age-of-entry structure in the remaining host countries.
Observations account for 75 percent of the data set and the remaining 25 percent
were obtained by econometric estimation. The resulting corrected skilled emigration
rates, which can be seen as intermediate bounds to the brain drain estimates, are by
construction lower than those computed without age-of-entry restrictions by Docquier
and Marfouk (2006), which we take as our upper-bound brain drain measure.
The results for the year 2000 show that on average, 68 percent of the global
brain drain is accounted for by emigration of people aged 22 or more upon arrival
(the ￿gures are 78 percent and 87 percent for the 18 and 12 year old thresholds,
respectively). For some countries there is indeed a substantial di⁄erence between the
corrected and uncorrected rates, with a minimal ratio between the two equal to 51
percent. Similar results were obtained for the year 1990. The correlation between
10Besides, some received home-country governments funds to pursue their studies abroad, which
also induces a ￿scal loss for the origin country.
9the corrected and uncorrected rates is very high11 and cross-country di⁄erences are
globally maintained in the corrected data sets. This should a priori mitigate concerns
about children migration possibly leading to cross-sectional biases in the brain drain
estimates and, consequently, about potential biases in the estimation of the incentive
e⁄ect of the brain drain using uncorrected data. This will be con￿rmed empirically
in Section 4.5 below.
3.3 Other data
Given that we focus on the brain drain impact on developing countries, our sample
excludes high-income countries as well as countries from the former USSR, Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia (for consistency between the 1990 and the 2000 data points),
which gives a total sample of 127 developing countries. The data sources for the
other RHS variables in equation (6) and the alternative speci￿cations (see below) are
as follows:
￿ Data on GNI and GDP per capita, population size (POPt) and population
density (DENSt), life expectancy at birth (LEt), workers￿remittances (RMt)
and youth literacy rates (LITt) are taken from the World Development Indica-
tors (World Bank, 2005). The GNI per capita is measured in US$, using the
Atlas method. The GDP per capita is measured in constant 2000 US$.
￿ Data on net school enrolment rates by schooling level (SEL
t ; L = P;S;T for
primary, secondary and tertiary schooling) and public education expenditures
per student as percent of GDP per capita (EXP L
t , L = P;S;T) were provided
by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (IUS), Montreal.
￿ Data on racial tensions (RAC) come from the International Country Risk Guide
(1984)
￿ Regional dummies SSAD and LATD are according to the commonly used
World Bank classi￿cation
￿ Dummies based on poverty rates (POOR) are taken from the United Nations.
We use the 1990-2003 average proportion of the population living with less than
$1 a day.
4 Results
Before we carry out the estimations, we ￿rst address some speci￿cation issues. Then
we give the results for the benchmark model and for alternative speci￿cations.
11The correlation between global (DM) and corrected rates (12+, 18+ and 22+) are respectively
99.7, 99.3 and 98.7 percent.
104.1 Econometric issues
A ￿rst important question concerns the exogeneity of the migration rate. When
trying to determine the impact of migration on education, one has to control for
the reverse e⁄ect since, on average, the proportion of educated is likely to a⁄ect
the rate of skilled migration. This is due to a number of causes. First, as standard
neoclassical models would suggest, a larger stock of human capital may reduce the skill
premium and thus increase skilled migration incentives through higher international
wage di⁄erentials. However, a larger stock of human capital may also generate positive
externalities on wages through a variety of channels emphasized in new growth and
new economic geography models (see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). Second,
with an immigration system based on quotas by country (as was the case for the US
system until 1965), the higher the supply of skilled workers in the source country, the
lower their probability to emigrate.
In an attempt to cope with this endogeneity issue, recent empirical growth analyses
(e.g., Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995, Hall and Jones, 1999) have been concerned with
the use of truly exogenous instruments. In these studies, the following variables have
been suggested as candidate instruments for a ￿rst-stage migration equation:
￿ Life expectancy at birth (LE90); as a proxy for general living conditions;
￿ The country￿ s population size (POP90), as small countries tend to be more open
to migration. Also, following the above discussion on immigration quotas, it is
clear that if visas are delivered on a country basis they are likely to be more
binding in the case of large countries;
￿ Racial tensions (RAC), a key traditional ￿ push￿factor;
￿ The number of emigrants living in the OECD area at the beginning of the
period (MT), to capture the size of the migration network on which prospective
emigrants can count on;12.
￿ The GDP per capita of the source country, as a proxy for wage di⁄erentials ￿
clearly a driving force of migration.
We retain only two out of these ￿ve candidate instruments in our ￿rst-stage mi-
gration equation as we have to eliminate the variables for which there is a strong pre-
sumption of a correlation with human capital. This is the case for wage di⁄erentials,
for obvious reasons,13 and for life expectancy, the exogeneity of which is question-
able given the fact that longer-lived individuals can enjoy the bene￿ts of education
12As is well known, larger networks are associated with lower migration costs (especially
information-related ones) and higher expected wages; all else equal, they should act to increase
the number of future migrants. See for example Carrington et al. (1996), Munshi (2003), and
Kanbur and Rapoport (2005).
13As a crude test, the correlation between wage di⁄erentials and human capital levels is indeed
higher than 0.5.
11over a longer period of time. We also exclude racial tensions, for both technical and
substantive reasons. Technically, their introduction would result in a signi￿cant drop
in the size of the sample used in the instrumental variable (IV) estimation, which
would lower the comparability with the OLS results.14 More substantively, it could
well be that racial tensions impact on human capital formation, especially if ethnic
discrimination is a serious issue.15 We are therefore left with two instrumental vari-
ables: total population size, and migration stocks at the beginning of the period. At
a theoretical level, there is no obvious reason why the demographic size of a country
should be correlated to its education level. Likewise, there is no a priori reason why
migration networks at destination should impact on human capital formation beyond
their e⁄ect on migration prospects and incentives (captured by our instrumentation
equation). Since we have only one endogeneous explanatory variable, the number of
instruments is large enough to test for exogeneity of the retained intruments using a
standard overidenti￿cation test.
At an empirical level, the validity of our instruments rests on two conditions: the
instruments should ￿rst be signi￿cantly correlated with the migration rate, and the
exogeneity condition requires that they should be uncorrelated with the error term
in (6).
Equation (7) reports the results of an OLS regression of the migration equation










2 = 0:509;Nobs = 127;F = 97:14:
The two instruments are signi￿cant at the 1% signi￿cance level and are therefore
kept throughout the analysis. Interestingly, population size enters with a negative
sign; this supports the conjecture mentioned above, according to which immigration
restrictions are more binding for larger countries and, in turn, further justi￿es the
assumption that education decisions are taken in a context of uncertainty regarding
future migration opportunities, as asssumed in the theoretical model. This is also in
line with the general argument that small countries are more open to emigration. Note
also that the sign of ln(MT) is in line with intuition: a higher initial stock of migrants
stimulates future emigration. Together, the variables ln(MT) and ln(POP) account
for more than 50% of the migration variability, which is quite satisfactory for a cross-
section analysis. A more formal test relies on the value of the F statistics testing
14More precisely, the sample size falls to 59 countries when racial tensions are added to the set
of instruments. We still obtain a positive incentive e⁄ect (of a higher magnitude) and conclude in
favour of the exogeneity of the three instruments. The ￿rst-stage estimation also supports racial
tensions as a strong instrument at the 10% signi￿cance level. The results with this speci￿cation are
available from the authors upon request.
15See Tremblay (2001) and Docquier and Rapoport (2003a,b).
12the null hypothesis that all coe¢ cients in (7) jointly equal zero. The test reveals
that this null hypothesis is clearly rejected, suggesting that the two instruments are
strong. Finally, given that we have more instruments than endogeneous variables, a
J ￿ test of overidenti￿cation was also run to assess the exogeneity property of the
retained instruments, the p-values of which are reported in the result tables below.
For the parcimonious speci￿cation, the test supports the exogeneity assumption of
the two instruments, thus providing additional con￿dence that our instruments are
indeed uncorrelated with the human capital variable.
4.2 The benchmark model
We now turn to the estimation of equation (6). Table 1 reports the estimation results
for the full speci￿cation and for a more parcimonious model from which insigni￿cant
variables such as LATD, DENS90 and REM90 were excluded. Exclusion of the lat-
ter variable leads to a signi￿cant increase in the number of countries included (from
103 to 127). The results appear to be very robust to the choice of speci￿cation and
of the estimation technique (OLS and IV): Skilled migration appears to signi￿cantly
increase gross (or ex-ante, or pre-migration) human capital stocks. The value of the
migration coe¢ cient amounts to 0.0545 or 0.0565 for the OLS estimate (depending
on whether the constant and the insigni￿cant explanatory variables are included)
and is slightly lower (0.0514 in the parcimonious regression) after instrumenting.16
Taken literally, this means that doubling the migration propensity of the highly skilled
increases gross human capital formation by 5 percent. This is not negligible in coun-
tries where the proportion of highly educated typically lies in the 2-8 percent range
and higher education signi￿cantly increases (by a factor of 5 to 10) one￿ s chances of
emigration.
Regarding the other control variables, we ￿nd evidence of convergence in human
capital levels among the developing countries sampled. Indeed, the coe¢ cient on the
lagged human capital stock is negative and signi￿cant at the one percent threshold in
all speci￿cations. Moreover, in line with the ￿ndings of Easterly and Levine (1997),
we ￿nd that Sub-Saharian countries display poor performances in terms of human
capital formation. In contrast, population density and the dummy variable for Latin-
America do not seem to exert any signi￿cant impact and are therefore omitted in the
parcimonious speci￿cations. Finally, workers￿remittances are also signi￿cant and,
negative, which is consistent with a moral hazard story but also and maybe more
importantly, raises endogeneity concerns. However, since we already instrument mi-
gration, instrumenting remittances raises methodological di¢ culties (see McKenzie,
2006) which are beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, including remittances
has almost no e⁄ect on the magnitude of the main coe¢ cients while their inclusion
16The IV results obtained without a constant are not reported here to save space. In this regres-
sion, the estimated incentive e⁄ect amounts to 0.057. We obtain similar results with respect to the
Hausman test and the over-identi￿cation test.
13substantially reduces the size of the sample. For all these reasons, we usually leave
remittances aside in our parcimonious speci￿cations.
Table 1: Benchmark regressions
OLS OLS IV IV
Constant -0.013 - -0.015 -0.131
(0.14) (0.14) (1.67)*
Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.054 0.057 0.054 0.045
(2.03)** (2.24)** (2.15)** (2.14)**
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.239 -0.232 -0.239 -0.240
(6.52)*** (7.48)*** (6.70)*** (6.45)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.450 -0.446 -0.450 -0.349
(4.29)*** (4.40)*** (4.49)*** (4.04)***
Latin American dummy -0.091 -0.103 -0.090 -
(1.46) (2.14)** (1.48)
Population density -0.000 -0.000 -
(1.36) (1.39)
Remittances per capita in 1990 -0.798 -0.827 -0.798 -
(2.06)** (2.07)** (2.13)**
F-stat ￿rst stage - - 124.41 162.12
Hausman 0.967 0.954
Observations 103 104 103 127
R-squared 0.46 0.79 0.46 0.38
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
While the overiden￿cation test supports the exogeneity of the two instruments
in the parcimonious speci￿cation, the Hausman test does not support the need for
accounting for reverse causality. The p-values associated with this test for the two
speci￿cations considered are indeed above the usual signi￿cance levels (see Columns 3
and 4 in Table 1). Regardless of the retained speci￿cation and the estimation method,
the coe¢ cient of the rate of migration is signi￿cantly positive at a 5 percent level.
The benchmark elasticity of human capital formation to skilled migration is obtained
in column (2) of Table 1. In this best parcimonious speci￿cation, we have a2 = 5:65
percent. Using the standard error of the coe¢ cient, we can also provide an interval
of con￿dence at 95 percent for the elasticity. The lower bound for a2 is equal to 0.86
percent and the upper bound amounts to 10.44 percent. Hence, the incentive e⁄ect
is de￿nitely positive.
4.3 Alternative functional forms
Our empirical model is based on a particular log-linear speci￿cation for the incen-
tive e⁄ect. From Equation (6), the parameter a2 can be directly interpreted as the
14elasticity of human capital formation to skilled migration prospects. Let us now ex-
amine the robustness of the results to the speci￿cation. For this purpose, we consider
two alternative speci￿cations where the incentive mechanism operates through either
ln(1 + p90) or directly through p90 :
￿ln(Ha) = a0 + a1:ln(Ha;90) + a2:ln(1 + p90) + a3:DENS90 + a4:SSAD
+a5:LATD + a6:RM90 + ￿ (8)
￿ln(Ha) = a0 + a1:ln(Ha;90) + a2:p90 + a3:DENS90 + a4:SSAD
+a5:LATD + a6:RM90 + ￿ (9)
Table 2 gives the results for these alternative functional forms. Column A recalls
the results obtained from the baseline model. Columns B1 and B2 give the complete
and parcimonious results obtained with the speci￿cation (8). The constant is now sig-
ni￿cant and the controls which were already signi￿cant in the benchmark model (i.e.,
the initial human capital level, the sub-Saharan dummy, the skilled migration rate
and the amount of remittances) remain so. As justi￿ed above, we eliminate remit-
tances in the parcimonious regression. Clearly, the signi￿cance level of the incentive
e⁄ect becomes much stronger once ln(1+p90) is used. However, the coe¢ cient a2 can
no longer be interpreted as an elasticity and does not allow for an easy interpretation
of the magnitude of the e⁄ect.
Columns C1 and C2 give the complete and parcimonious results obtained with
the speci￿cation (9). The constant is now signi￿cant as are the controls which were
already signi￿cant in the benchmark model. Again, remittances are left aside in the
parcimonious regression. The coe¢ cient on skilled migration as measured by p90 is
equal to 0.28. Taken literally, this means that a 10 percentage points increase in
skilled migration increases the growth rate of human capital by 2.8 percentage points
over a decade.
On the whole, the results with additional functional forms therefore point to a
robust relationship between skilled migration prospects and human caiptal formation
in origin countries.
15Table 2: Alternative speci￿cations for the incentive e⁄ect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.013 -0.242 -0.333 -0.237 -0.327
(0.14) (2.33)** (3.21)*** (2.31)** (3.18)***
Sk mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.054 - - - -
(2.03)**
1+ Sk mig rate in 1990 (logs) - 0.434 0.391 - -
(2.77)*** (3.23)***
Sk mig rate in 1990 - - - 0.307 0.278
(2.67)*** (3.15)***
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.239 -0.247 -0.248 -0.248 -0.250
(6.52)*** (6.56)*** (6.46)*** (6.51)*** (6.43)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.450 -0.440 -0.347 -0.440 -0.348
(4.29)*** (4.35)*** (4.11)*** (4.31)*** (4.09)***
Latin American dummy -0.091 -0.086 - -0.081 -
(1.46) (1.33) (1.26)
Population density -0.000 -0.000 - -0.000 -
(1.36) (1.60) (1.58)
Remittances per capita -0.798 -0.659 - -0.659 -
(2.06)** (1.82)* (1.82)*
Observations 103 103 128 103 128
R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.47 0.40
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
4.4 Testing for non-linearities
Until now, the regressions have assumed that the incentive e⁄ect of migration on
education is homogeneous across countries. However, one may be concerned about
possible non-linearities in the relationship between migration prospects and human
capital formation at di⁄erent income levels. We allow for this possibility by interacting
the skilled emigration rate in 1990, ln(p90); with dummy variables for whether the
country￿ s income per capita was lower than a given threshold at the beginning of the
period, GNID90. We therefore augment the benchmark speci￿cation by adding the
interaction term ln(p90):GNID to the set of explanatory variables of equation (6),
where GNID is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is a low income country:
￿ln(Ha;90￿00) = a0 + a1:ln(Ha;90) + a2:ln(p90) + a3:ln(p90):GNID90
+a4:DENS90 + a5:SSAD + a6:LATD + a7:RM90 + ￿ (10)
A negative sign for the coe¢ cient a3 would suggest a weaker incentive e⁄ect in poor
countries, due maybe to binding credit constraints on education investment or the
16lower expected transferability of human capital in poor country. Obviously, robustness
checks imply the use of di⁄erent possible thresholds. We therefore interact skilled
migration rates with a dummy variable for low-income status using three alternative
threshold values of the 1990 GNI per head (500, 750 and 900 US$).
The advantage of this speci￿cation is that the correlation between the raw migra-
tion rate and the interaction term remains modest, which moderates the statistical
e⁄ects of collinearity. Table 3 reports the results with this speci￿cation. As the Haus-
man test conducted above tended to con￿rm the exogeneity of the migration rate, we
only present the OLS results for the speci￿cation with interaction terms.17
On the whole, the results do not provide any evidence of a di⁄erent impact for the
poorest countries. In all regressions, the interaction term ln(p90):GNID is insigni￿-
cant at usual signi￿cance levels. Interestingly, the value of the migration coe¢ cient,
ln(p90); seems una⁄ected by the inclusion of interaction terms. However, one may be
concerned that in the absence of information on income distribution, average income
levels may only imperfectly capture the extent of liquidity constraints. In unreported
regressions, we also interacted skilled migration with a dummy variable POOR for
whether more than 40% of the country￿ s population live with less than one dollar per
day. As with the previous de￿nition, no signi￿cant di⁄erences were found between
poor and richer countries, leading us to conclude to the absence of non-linearities in
the skilled migration-human capital formation relationship.
Table 3: Conditional e⁄ects
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.187 -0.176 -0.178
(2.32)** (1.91)* (2.14)**
Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.030 0.034 0.031
(2.10)** (2.55)** (2.39)**
Skilled migr rate* Income dummy 0.040 0.021 0.026
(1.15) (0.67) (0.95)
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.257 -0.253 -0.254
(6.13)*** (5.47)*** (5.92)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.346 -0.356 -0.351
(4.04)*** (4.11)*** (4.09)***
Observations 128 128 128
R-squared 0.40 0.39 0.39
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
17Using the values of p90 predicted by the ￿rst stage migration regression leads to similar estimates.
These results are available upon request.
174.5 Alternative measures of migration prospects
4.5.1 Controlling for age of entry
One may be concerned that the positive incentive e⁄ect emphasized above is due to
a potential mismeasurement of the brain drain. Indeed, the DM estimates count as
skilled immigrants all foreign born individuals independently of whether they acquired
education in the home or the host country. In reality, some of them migrated at a
very young age, bene￿ted from the education systems in the receiving countries, and
it is therefore disputable whether they should be considered part of the brain drain
from their country of birth. As explained, this may lead to an over-estimation of the
intensity of the brain drain as well as to spurious cross-country variation in the brain
drain estimates.
To address this issue, we use the alternative measures of the brain drain of Beine
et al. (2007), where skilled immigrants are de￿ned as those who immigrated after age
12, 18 or 22. Denoting by MJ
t;s the number of skilled emigrants who left their country
after age J, we compute for each sending country alternative skilled emigration rates


















We then test models (6) and (8) using these alternatives measures. Table 4 de-
scribes the results. It may be seen that the incentive e⁄ect is always positive and
signi￿cant. Recall that the elasticity of human capital formation to skilled migration
was 5.65 percent in the benchmark model. As expected, this elasticity decreases as
more skilled migrants are excluded according to an age-of-entry criterion. In the
parcimonious models, it is equal to 4.2 percent, 4.2 percent and 4.3 percent after
excluding migrants who left respectively before ages 12, 18 and 22. Nevertheless, the
incentive e⁄ect remains positive and highly signi￿cant.
Note that the constant is always signi￿cant and that the controls which were
signi￿cant in the benchmark speci￿cation (i.e., the initial level of human capital, the
sub-Saharan dummy, and the amount of remittances) remain so. The coe¢ cients
and the R2 are very stable across models. As may be seen from Colums B1 and B2
in Table 4, similar qualitative results are obtained when combining the brain drain
estimates controlling for age of entry with the alternative functional form (8) of the
incentive e⁄ect. Clearly, these results further support the robustness of the incentive
mechanism.
18Table 4: Controlling for age of entry (1/2)
Excl. migr. arrived before age 12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.135 -0.132 -0.332 -0.330
(1.81)* (1.73)* (3.15)*** (3.21)***
Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.046 0.042
(1.90)* (2.26)**
1+ Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.374 0.392
(2.87)*** (3.23)***
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.258 -0.239 -0.264 -0.249
(6.32)*** (6.32)*** (6.40)*** (6.44)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.439 -0.351 -0.432 -0.349
(4.43)*** (4.02)*** (4.44)*** (4.09)***
Remittances per capita in 1990 -0.733 -0.628
(1.88)* (1.67)*
Observations 104 128 104 128
R-squared 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.40
Excl. migr. arrived before age 18
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.130 -0.126 -0.327 -0.326
(1.73)* (1.65) (3.16)*** (3.22)***
Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.046 0.042
(1.97)* (2.33)**
1+ Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.378 0.400
(2.87)*** (3.21)***
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.257 -0.239 -0.264 -0.249
(6.33)*** (6.33)*** (6.40)*** (6.43)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.440 -0.352 -0.434 -0.351
(4.43)*** (4.02)*** (4.43)*** (4.09)***
Remittances per capita in 1990 -0.733 -0.635
(1.89)* (1.68)*
Observations 104 128 104 128
R-squared 0.45 0.38 0.46 0.40
19Table 4: Controlling for age of entry (2/2)
Excl. migr. arrived before age 22
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.123 -0.119 -0.321 -0.321
(1.64) (1.55) (3.15)*** (3.21)***
Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.046 0.043
(2.02)** (2.40)**
1+ Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.388 0.415
(2.80)*** (3.16)***
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.257 -0.239 -0.263 -0.248
(6.34)*** (6.33)*** (6.40)*** (6.44)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.440 -0.352 -0.435 -0.351
(4.44)*** (4.03)*** (4.43)*** (4.09)***
Remittances per capita in 1990 -0.730 -0.639
(1.89)* (1.70)*
Observations 104 128 104 128
R-squared 0.45 0.39 0.46 0.40
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
4.5.2 Ratio of skilled/unskilled emigration rates
In our theoretical model above, we normalized for analytical convenience the emi-
gration prospects of unskilled workers to zero. However, the theoretical mechanism
is based not so much on the absolute propensity of skilled workers to emigrate but
on the relative propensity. Indeed, in a setting (as ours) where skilled premia are
assumed constant across locations, the incentive to invest in education in a context of
migration comes from the increase in the odds of migration for people with su¢ cient
(tertiary) education. This aspect, while in the background of our discussion, has not
been incorporated explicitly in our econometric analysis. To analyze the sensitivity
of our results to the use of the absolute v. relative skilled emigration propensity, we





90); with ps and pu standing for the emigration rates of skilled and unskilled work-
ers respectively. As can be seen from Table 5, the results with a relative measure of
migration prospects are fairly similar to those obtained with the absolute measure.
In particular, our main coe¢ cient of interest and its signi￿cance levels are basically
unchanged.
20Table 5: Alternative (relative) measure of migration prospects
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.005 - -
(0.04)
Di⁄ skilled-unskilled mig rates (log) 0.053 0.057 0.051
(1.80)* (2.05)** (2.45)**
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.236 -0.225 -0.205
(6.50)*** (7.28)*** (8.40)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.455 -0.413 -0.321
(4.21)*** (4.46)*** (4.27)***
Latin American dummy -0.082 - -
(1.30)
Population density -0.000 - -
(1.41)
Remittances per capita in 1990 -0.757 -0.713 -
(1.93)* (1.83)*
Observations 101 102 126
R-squared 0.46 0.78 0.76
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
4.6 Alternative measures of human capital investment
In this section, we test the incentive mechanism when alternative measures of human
capital investment are used. In the benchmark model, we used the change in the
proportion of tertiary educated natives (residents + emigrants) between 1990 and
2000. The regressions below are based on two other possible measures, namely, school




95) = a0 + a1:ln(SE
L￿1





+a5:SSAD + a6:LATD + a7:RM90 + ￿ (11)
ln(LIT95) = a0 + a1:ln(EXP
S
90) + a2:ln(p90) + a4:ln(EXP
L
95)
+a5:SSAD + a6:LATD + a7:RM90 + ￿ (12)
where SEL
95 is the 1995 net rate of school enrolment at education level L (L = T;S;P
for tertiary, secondary and primary education), SE
L￿1
90 is the 1990 enrolment rate at
schooling level just below L (except for primary education), EXP L
95 is the amount of
public expenditures in US$ per student at education level L, and LIT95 is the youth
literacy rate in 1995. The variable pL
90 stands for the emigration rate of individuals
who emigrated after graduating in their country (i.e. after age 22 for L = T, after
age 18 for L = S and after age 12 for L = P).
21Table 6 describes the results. The left panel of Table 6 gives the results for school
enrolment, ￿rst with the speci￿cation in (11) (in Columns T1, S1 and P1) and then
with ln(1 + p90) instead of ln(p90) (in Columns T2, S2 and P2). The right panel of
Table 6 describes the results obtained for the regressions using (12) and the same
functional forms as above.
Regarding school enrolment, we do not ￿nd any evidence of an incentive e⁄ect of
skilled emigration when using the log-linear speci￿cation (11). The coe¢ cient asso-
ciated to the skilled emigration rate is never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This is
consistent with the results of Faini (2003), who found a depressing but not signi￿cant
e⁄ect of tertiary emigration on domestic enrolment in higher education. However,
when we use ln(1 + p90) instead of ln(p90), the e⁄ect of skilled migration becomes
signi￿cant, with a negative impact on tertiary schooling and a positive impact on
secondary schooling. Finally, public education expenditures are not signi￿cant, ex-
cept for secondary enrolment. The enrolment rate is strongly determined by the
lagged enrolment rate at the lower level. The sub-Saharan dummy is always highly
signi￿cant.
Regarding literacy rates, however, we ￿nd strong evidence of an incentive e⁄ect
whatever the speci￿cation used, with an elasticity of about 4.5 percent.
Coming back to school enrolment, how can we explain that, depending on the
speci￿cation used, school enrolment rates are either not a⁄ected by skilled migration
prospects while the other measures of human capital investment are, or that they
are negatively a⁄ected (for tertiary school enrolment) while the others measures of
human capital investment are positively a⁄ected? A ￿rst explanation could be that
school enrolment data raise more measurement problems than human capital stock
data as the latter result from an aggregation of ￿ ows and are therefore less subject
to periodical measurement errors.
A second explanation is suggested by Faini (2003), who attributes his ￿nding of
a potentially depressing e⁄ect of skilled emigration on tertiary and secondary school
enrolment to the choice of would-be migrants to pursue their studies abroad. Our
￿ndings are di⁄erent as they show either no impact (with the ln(p90) speci￿cation)
or a signi￿cant incentive e⁄ect at the secondary level and a negative e⁄ect at the
tertiary level (with the ln(1+p90) speci￿cation). The latter is consistent with a story
where skilled migration prospects lead more students to invest in secondary schooling
at home to buy and then exercise the option of studying abroad at the upper level,
an interpretation we do not want to push too far given the lack of robustness of
the results. Note also that while our main measure of human capital formation
(the change in the proportion of highly educated among natives) accounts for return
migration of skilled migrants, school enrolment indicators do not, which could also



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 7: Accounting for the age structure of the population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.122 - - -
(0.20)
Skilled mig rate in 1990 (logs) 0.054 0.056 0.055 0.057
(1.71)* (2.20)** (2.22)** (2.24)**
Stock of HK in 1990 (logs) -0.235 -0.233 -0.236 -0.232
(6.56)*** (6.29)*** (7.29)*** (7.48)***
Sub-Saharan African dummy -0.449 -0.447 -0.449 -0.446
(4.08)*** (4.30)*** (4.26)*** (4.40)***
Latin American dummy -0.097 -0.102 -0.096 -0.103
(1.48) (1.54) (2.05)** (2.14)**
Remittances per capita in 1990 -0.828 -0.811 -0.802 -0.827
(2.01)** (2.06)** (2.10)** (2.07)**
Population density -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -
(1.21) (1.49) (1.56)
Share of population 15-24 0.754 0.086 - -
(0.30) (0.17)
Share of population 49-55 -1.081 - - -
(0.27)
Observations 103 103 103 104
R-squared 0.47 0.80 0.80 0.79
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Finally, a third interpretation is that the positive e⁄ect on natives￿human capital
investment emphasized in our benchmark regressions and beyond results from the age
distribution of the population in sending countries. Indeed, developing countries are
characterized by important turnover rates, with young and better educated workers
enterring massively into the labor force. If the turnover rate is for whatever reason
higher in countries with high skilled emigration rates, this will induce a spurious
mechanism leading to overestimate the strenght of the incentive e⁄ect. We address
this issue in Table 7 where we control for the share of workers aged 15-24 and 55-64
in the benchmark regression. These demographic shares are never signi￿cant and do
not distort the results.
5 Conclusion
The brain drain has long been viewed as a serious constraint on poor countries de-
velopment. However recent theoretical literature suggests that migration prospects
can raise the expected return to human capital and foster gross (pre-migration) in-
vestment in education at home. This paper empirically assesses the robustness and
24magnitude of this incentive mechanism, also referred to in the literature as a "brain
gain". We ￿rst reproduced our benchmark speci￿cation, as appeared in Beine et al.
(2008), where we found evidence of a positive e⁄ect of skilled migration prospects
on human capital investment in a cross-section of 127 developing countries. In that
benchmark model, we measure human capital formation by the log variation in the
proportion of highly-skilled workers among the native labor force. The elasticity of
human capital growth to skilled emigration prospects was found to be in the neigh-
borhood of 5% and was very stable across speci￿cations and estimation methods
(OLS and IV). In this paper we check the robustness of these results and obtain
similar qualitative resuts when using alternative brain drain estimates controlling for
whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or in the host country and when
using a relative (instead of an absolute) measure of migration propensity. We also
regressed other indicators of human capital investment on skilled migration rates and
found a positive e⁄ect on youth literacy while the e⁄ect on school enrolment depends
on the exact speci￿cation used. Notwithstanding the latter ￿nding, which still needs
quali￿cation, and within the limits of a cross-sectional analysis, our results point to
a robust, positive and sizeable e⁄ect of skilled migration prospects on human capital
formation in developing countries.
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